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ABSTRACT: The Anaximander fragment, in the readings of both Heidegger and 
Derrida, speaks of that which exceeds positive law. In this article, the author provides 
a detailed reading of Heidegger’s Der Spruch des Anaximander, showing how 
Heidegger relates this fragment to his thinking of Being, the latter having been 
‘forgotten’ by metaphysics. Heidegger’s reading at the same time involves a 
contemplation of technology and of the ontological relation of beings to each other. 
Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s Der Spruch highlights specifically those parts of 
Heidegger’s text where that which precedes Being’s gathering, Being’s disjoining or 
dissemination, is pointed to. This disjoining, Derrida contends, speaks of the gift of a 
day more ancient than memory itself and ties in closely with certain aspects of the 
thinking of Marx. Derrida’s focus on that which precedes Being is in turn related to 
his contemplation of the law or condition of possibility of technology and also of that 
which makes possible a relation to the other as other. This condition of possibility, or 
the gift of Being, which Heidegger’s text also speaks of, involves a ‘higher law’ which 
can serve as a ‘measure’ for the evaluation, interpretation and transformation of 
positive law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It can hardly be disputed that in most Western democracies, despite their Bills of 
Rights, and primarily because of the effects of the free market, the gap between rich 
and poor is growing ever wider. In many parts of the rest of the world, poverty, 
inequality and suffering are even more widespread. Western democracies and 
international law dominated by Western legal and conceptual thinking has 
contributed and still contributes directly and indirectly to this state of affairs. This 
urgently calls for reflection on the notion of a ‘higher law’ which could function as a 
‘measure’, in the interpretation as well as in the reform of national and international 
legal norms and concepts. Natural law theory in its present forms, as well as most of 
the other legal philosophical theories developed in the twentieth century, is capable of 
giving only limited assistance in this regard, especially because of their failure to 
confront their inscription within what can for the moment simply be termed 
‘Platonism’. In admittedly different ways and to different extents, the thinking of 
Heidegger and of Derrida as well as some of those following in their wake can assist 
in proceeding beyond the current impasse in legal thinking. Heidegger’s thinking in 
relation to Being as inter alia elaborated on in his reading of the oldest surviving 
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fragment of Western thinking, Der Spruch des Anaximander (Heidegger 1975, 13-58; 
2003, 296-343),1 provides an indispensable starting point for thinking about justice 
in the 21st century and beyond. Heidegger’s contemplation of Being in Der Spruch 
and elsewhere ties in with natural law thinking insofar as it concerns itself with the 
‘origin’ of beings, including of law. In his reading of the early Greek thinkers he 
however challenges the notion that they are simply contemplating the laws of nature, 
as is usually believed.  
 
The focus of this article, as the title indicates, will be the fragment of Anaximander (ca 
610 BC to 547 BC). Anaximander is usually referred to as a pre-Socratic thinker. Like 
Thales, Anaximander reflected on the origin, principle or rule (arche) of that which 
exists. Whereas Thales thought that everything that exists derived from water, 
Anaximander regarded the apeiron, the limitless, indeterminate or indefinite as that 
from which all things derive. Simplicius, in his book On Aristotle’s Physics, drawing 
from Theophrastus, reports the saying of Anaximander as follows: 
 
Anaximander of Miletos, son of Praxiades, a fellow-citizen and associate of Thales, 
said that the material cause [arche] and first element of things was the Infinite 
[apeiron], he being the first to introduce this name of the material cause. He says it is 
neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but a substance different from 
them which is infinite [apeiron]; from which arise all the heavens and the worlds 
within them.  
… 
And into that from which things take their rise [genesis] they pass away [phthoran] 
once more, “as is meet [kata to chreon]; for they make reparation and satisfaction 
[didonai diken kai tisin] to one another for their injustice [allelois tes adikias] 
according to the ordering of time,” as he says in these somewhat poetical terms 
(Burnet 1920, ch 1, s 13, footnotes omitted).  
 
The ancient Greeks did not use quotation marks, so that it is not perfectly clear where 
the actual words of Anaximander start and where they end. The quotation marks 
above were introduced later on. The translations of Nietzsche in a treatise completed 
in 1873 and published posthumously in 1903 and of Diels, also from 1903, referred to 
by Heidegger, are similar in most respects to that of Burnet. For our purposes the 
most important differences lie in Nietzsche’s translation of the phrase didonai…diken 
kai tisin allelois tes adikias as “they must pay penalty and be judged for their 
injustice” and Diels as “they pay recompense and penalty to one another for their 
recklessness” (Heidegger 1984, 13).  
 
Through a close reading of Heidegger’s Der Spruch as well as a brief overview of 
Derrida’s commentary on this text in Spectres of Marx (1994, 23-9),2 a preliminary 
attempt will be made in this article to rethink the notion of a higher law as a ‘measure’ 
                                                 
1
 This text was published for the first time in 1950. The German version will be referred to only in cases where it 
requires our specific attention. 
2
 Specters of Marx of course ties in very closely with Derrida (1992a, 3-67 and 1992b).  
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for positive law.3 The detailed reading of Heidegger undertaken here is called for by 
the inadequate attention his analysis of the fragment has thus far received in the legal 
context.4 A patient reading of Heidegger’s text is worth double the effort as it is (only) 
through such a reading that Derrida’s reading can (also) be understood. An analysis 
which does justice to Derrida’s reading would require a detailed analysis of the 
relevant pages in Specters as well as a consideration of their broader context, an 
analysis of Derrida’s other texts on Heidegger, the meticulous consideration of a 
number of aspects of Derrida’s writings, including his relation with Levinas vis-à-vis 
Heidegger regarding the respect to be accorded to the other as other, technology, the 
necessary and impossible task of translation, the ghost and its relation to the work of 
Abraham and Torok, the notion of inheritance, as well the work of mourning and the 
death drive as analysed by Freud. For reasons of space such a comprehensive analysis 
will not be possible here. It will have to suffice to briefly outline Derrida’s evaluation 
of Heidegger’s reading. 
 
HEIDEGGER’S READING OF THE FRAGMENT 
 
Prologue 
 
Before enquiring in more detail into Heidegger’s reading of the Anaximander 
fragment, it is necessary to place his reading in a broader context. As also appears 
from his other texts, Heidegger is of the view that metaphysics started with 
Platonism, when Being or the ‘is’ of beings is interpreted as the most universal of 
beings and as idea (Heidegger 1982, 164). Being is therefore interpreted on the basis 
of beings and with reference to (the essence of) beings. Being itself is not thought by 
metaphysics. Being is instead turned into a being, for example the Supreme Being as 
first cause or the subject of subjectivity (Heidegger 1982, 207-8). Metaphysics, as 
Heidegger (1982, 209) points out, has a fundamentally onto-theological character. A 
                                                 
3
 The word ‘measure’ is bound to be somewhat controversial here. The reference is of course not to a measure in 
the traditional sense; nonetheless the ‘notions’ of justice, the gift and hospitality in Derrida’s texts and which 
relate to the notion of a ‘higher law’ which is invoked here, clearly have a role which is not completely at odds 
with what is traditionally understood under ‘measure’; see eg Derrida and Roudinesco (2004, 60-61). Strictly 
speaking what we are dealing with here is a ‘measure without measure’. 
4
 The three most detailed considerations of Heidegger’s Der Spruch in a legal context are by Wolf (1950, 218-
34); Zartaloudis (2002, 213-6); and Oppermann (2003, 45-69). Oppermann reads the fragment as entailing a 
view of justice as a rhythmic process where tisis (understood as care) complements justice/law as restitution. 
This is no doubt a commendable proposal in principle. Unfortunately little account is taken in this article of 
Heidegger’s questioning of the metaphysical tradition by enquiring into Being and the ontological difference 
between Being and beings - apparent inter alia in the equation of Being in Heidegger’s thinking with ‘what is’ in 
the article (at 59). A conception of justice is thus developed which would clearly be metaphysical on Heidegger’s 
terms. Zartaloudis, relying primarily on Agamben, refers to Heidegger’s analysis of the fragment as part of an 
attempt to proceed beyond Heidegger’s thinking of Being (as well as that of Derrida) which is said to still be 
caught within the logic of transcendental negativity. He consequently reads dike in the fragment as the “unifying 
multiplicity-unity of what tends apart” (at 220). The claims of the author concerning the inadequacies in the 
thinking of Derrida and Heidegger regarding metaphysics can be addressed only indirectly in this article. Wolf’s 
exposition of the fragment, although not a commentary on Der Spruch, corresponds in most respects with that of 
Heidegger, more specifically with an earlier version based on lectures in 1941 at Freiburg University published 
in Heidegger (1981, 94-123). See also Douzinas (2000, 24-5); Hamacher, (2005, 887-8); Corrington (2002, 781-
802); Lewis (2006, 293-309). 
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further feature of metaphysics is its conceptuality which starts when with Plato, Being 
is understood as the essence of beings. The writings of the early Greek thinkers, 
including Anaximander, are not as yet under the influence of metaphysics and that is 
why Heidegger attaches such importance to them (cf. De Boer 2000, 177).5 Their 
importance furthermore lies in the intimation they had of, as Heidegger (2000, 174-
5) puts it, the “suddenness and uniqueness of Dasein, an intimation into which they 
were urged by Being itself”. This passage makes clear the close relation in Heidegger’s 
thinking, also after Being and Time (1962), between Being and Dasein, without 
however making of Being a product of man (Heidegger 1993, 240). The early Greek 
thinkers, as Heidegger also points out elsewhere, were exposed to Being which 
disclosed itself to them as physis, logos, dike, moira and chreon (Heidegger 1984, 55; 
2000, 175). Heidegger’s reading is therefore an attempt to read the fragment in a 
non-conceptual way, an attempt to ‘think like the early Greeks’.6  
 
Heidegger sees metaphysics as finding its ultimate expression in Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of Being as will to power. Because the metaphysics of subjectivity here 
attains the peak of its development, the most extreme withdrawal of Being takes place 
(Heidegger 1982, 237, 241). The consequence of this is a profound uncertainty in 
man. Because man is in a covert way the abode of Being itself in its advent, the 
withdrawal of Being leads to uncertainty without man being able to discover the 
source and essence of this uncertainty (Heidegger 1982, 235). This leads to man 
seeking self-assurance in beings which are “surveyed with regard to what they can 
offer by way of new and continuous possibilities of surety” (Heidegger 1982, 235, 
238). This search for certainty finds its ultimate expression in modern technology as 
an attempt to secure permanence, but which instead points to man’s homelessness.7 
The greater the danger that technology will slip away from human control, the more 
urgent the will to mastery becomes (Heidegger 1977, 5). The usual definitions of 
technology are that it is a means to an end or that it is an activity of man, both 
definitions being instrumental and anthropological in nature (Heidegger 1977, 4, 5). 
Heidegger seeks a definition of modern technology which brings it into relation with 
Being. For Heidegger (1977, 20), the essence of technology consists in enframing (Ge-
stell) which refers to the challenging forth of man “to reveal the real, in the mode of 
ordering, as standing reserve”. This role of standing reserve or being on call for duty 
is now also taken on by man himself (Heidegger 1977, 27). Enframing is not however 
here to be understood as a genus or as essence in the traditional way (Heidegger 1977, 
30). Heidegger in other words seeks to give a non-metaphysical definition of 
technology. Modern machine-power technology, although it only developed in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, is a result of representational or calculative 
                                                 
5
 This is of course not to suggest that Heidegger views Plato and Aristotle as representatives of a fallen sort of 
thinking in comparison to the early Greek thinkers. He clearly admires them and regards their thinking (also) as a 
radicalization and advancement in relation to the questions first raised by the early thinkers; see for example 
Heidegger (2008).  
6
 At the same time, it needs to be pointed out that Heidegger, in reading these texts, does not attempt to 
reconstruct what the early thinkers actually thought; see further infra.  
7
 For analyses of Heidegger’s views on technology in the legal context, see eg Wolcher (2004); and Tranter 
(2007). 
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thinking which according to Heidegger (1977, 22) has its origin in the seventeenth 
century. Enframing is in other words a result of the sending or destining of Being as 
objectifying representation (Heidegger 1977, 24, 29-30). Even in its concealment and 
precisely in its being concealed, Being nevertheless remains as promise of itself 
(Heidegger 1982, 226-7). Heidegger’s reflection on the early Greeks could be read as 
in part an attempt to address the question of modern technology. Heidegger does not, 
as is often thought, view technology simply negatively. He nevertheless sees an 
extreme danger in its essence. This danger, he notes, does not lie in the potentially 
lethal machines and apparatus of technology, but in its preventing man from entering 
“into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal 
truth” (Heidegger 1977, 28). Technology, we could say in somewhat simpler terms, 
points to the rule of subjectivism, both individual and collective, in modernity, and at 
the same time, shows that subjectivity as well as the certainty and security that 
seemingly goes with it, are an illusion (Heidegger 1977, 152). In the danger of 
technology therefore also lies a saving power, according to Heidegger (1977, 32-3), as 
it may reveal to man his essential belonging to and responsibility in relation to what 
grants, preserves or safeguards (das Gewährende). Technology can in other words 
show a way beyond subjectivity. 
 
Insofar as Heidegger’s reading of the fragment is concerned, it is important to note 
that he is not engaging in a philological or psychological exposition, seeking to 
determine what was present to the thought of Anaximander (Heidegger 1984, 18, 57). 
Such a reading would amount to a calculation and the loss of thinking (Scott 1994, 
131). Heidegger also does not seek to come to a more accurate formulation in his 
translation of Anaximander as compared to the standard translations (Scott 1994, 
132). This does not however mean that his is an arbitrary translation. The question 
Heidegger (1984, 20) seeks to answer is what comes to language in the fragment. As 
we will see, Being, and therefore also man’s relation to death, stands central in his 
reading. Heidegger’s ‘problem’ with traditional interpretations of the fragment lies in 
their relation to Platonism. Nietzsche categorises Anaximander as a pre-Platonic 
philosopher, and Diels refers to him as a pre-Socratic (Heidegger 1984, 14). Hegel, 
although he does not refer to the Anaximander fragment, regards the early Greek 
thinkers as pre-Aristotelian (Heidegger 1984, 15). The philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle are in this way used as a standard to consider and judge the early Greek 
thinkers. Platonic and Aristotelian concepts and representations are furthermore 
used to guide the interpretation of these thinkers. It is also mistaken, according to 
Heidegger (1984, 14), to believe that logical thinking can guide us in interpreting the 
fragment, as logic was developed only later in the Platonic and Aristotelian schools. 
Theophrastus, who lived until about 286BC, as Heidegger (1984, 15) furthermore 
points out, was a contemporary of Aristotle and the latter’s student. Both Aristotle 
and Theophrastus regarded the early thinkers as having contemplated the things of 
nature and as looking for the origins of beings in nature. This is also how these 
thinkers are thought of by Hegel and those after him. The word generally used for 
nature (physis), at the time of Aristotle however took on a different meaning than it 
had for the early Greek thinkers - the broad sense of the totality of being. Physis in 
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Platonic/Aristotelian thinking designated a special region of beings separated from 
ethos and logos. These reflections on nature of the early Greek thinkers are 
furthermore after Hegel thought of as inadequate in comparison with the thinking on 
nature developed in the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, as well as in the schools of 
Stoicism and of medicine (Heidegger 1984, 16).  
 
As already noted, the Anaximander fragment was copied by Simplicius in his 
commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, the commentary being written in 530 AD. 
Simplicius was a Neoplatonist, and the copy of the fragment derived from 
Theophrastus. As Heidegger (1984, 16) points out, from the time that Anaximander 
had pronounced his saying to the time that it was written down by Simplicius, more 
than 1000 years had gone by. Heidegger here raises the question whether the 
fragment can still tell us something after 2500 years. It being the oldest one given to 
us by the Western tradition of course does not give it any more weight. If the thinking 
expressed in it however surpasses all that came after it, the fragment would have a 
claim to our attention (Heidegger 1984, 18). As we saw above, according to 
Heidegger, the early Greek thinkers thought Being as such, whereas since Plato, Being 
had become the name for the essence of beings or the Supreme Being. Being is 
thought as constant presence, as presence at hand (Heidegger 2000, 206-8, 216, 
220). The early thinkers however thought of Being as presencing and of truth as 
unconcealment (Heidegger 1977, 146). At this stage of Greek thinking, as Heidegger 
(1984, 18) puts it, the “Being of beings is gathered (légesthai, logos) in the ultimacy of 
its destiny….The history of Being is gathered in this departure”. This destiny, as we 
saw above, according to Heidegger finds its ultimate expression in Nietzsche’s will to 
power. In addition to its other concerns, Heidegger’s reading of the fragment is an 
attempt to think the future in a way different from how it is done by historiography: 
predicting the future with reference to the past as determined by the present 
(Heidegger 1984, 17). This, according to Heidegger, effectively amounts to the 
destruction of the future. Derrida’s thinking, as we will see below, closely ties in with 
that of Heidegger in this respect (Derrida 2002, 219). 
 
Translating and interpreting the fragment 
 
Heidegger acknowledges that his translation will appear violent. However such 
‘violence’ is necessary if one is to attempt to understand what comes to language in 
the fragment, that is, if one reads it as a thinking of (the truth of) Being (Heidegger 
1984, 19, 20). The traditional interpretations of the fragment are to the effect that it 
refers to the origin and decay of things and that it describes the process thereof. In 
these interpretations the fragment describes a kind of economy of exchange in nature. 
It would thus be a vague statement about an exchange of constructive and destructive 
moments, but without as yet an understanding of the laws of motion. It would 
furthermore be a kind of primitive natural science, a description of nature in human 
terms of a moral and juridical nature, by referring to justice and injustice, 
recompense and penalty, sin and retribution. Theophrastus’s final words in the 
paragraph cited above would then be understood as rightful criticism of Anaximander 
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for his use of poetic terms to describe the processes of nature. Grammatically, 
Heidegger (1984, 20) points out, the fragment consists of two clauses. For easy 
reference, the Greek version of the fragment is set out here: 
 
ex on de he genesis esti tois ousi kai ten phthoran eis tauta ginesthai kata to chreon. 
didonai gar auta diken kai tisin allelois tes adikias kata ten tou chronou taxin. 
 
The matter of ta onta which is at stake in the first clause, Heidegger points out, 
literally refers to ‘things’ or ‘beings’ in their multiplicity. This is not a reference to an 
arbitrary multiplicity, but to the multiplicity of beings in their totality (Heidegger 
1984, 20-21). ‘Beings’ is furthermore not to be understood here as referring only to 
things or to the things of nature as the translation above as well as others seem to 
suggest. It refers also to man, “things produced by man”, “the situation or 
environment effected and realized by the deeds and omissions of men”, as well as 
“daimonic and divine things” (Heidegger 1984, 21). These are not simply also in 
being, as Heidegger (1984, 21; 2003, 305) notes, but are even more so in being 
(seiender) than are things of nature. Heidegger is here clearly alluding to his 
existential analysis in Being and Time of Dasein as the only being whose Being is an 
issue for it (Heidegger 1962, 32). The Aristotelian-Theophrastian assumption that the 
matter with which the first clause is concerned, ta onta, is to be understood as a 
reference to the things of nature in a narrow sense is therefore groundless (Heidegger 
1984, 21). This is also the case with the criticism that what Anaximander says here 
about nature and which should therefore have been expressed in scientific terms is 
imperfectly expressed by him in moral-juridical language. In interpreting the 
fragment one must furthermore abandon the idea that Anaximander is speaking here 
with reference to the traditional disciplines of ethics and jurisprudence. This does not 
however mean that Anaximander did not yet have an understanding of law and ethics 
(Sittlichkeit) (Heidegger 1984, 21; 2003, 305). The distinctions we currently draw 
between disciplines such as ethics, jurisprudence, physics, biology and psychology, 
were however not as yet made at the time of Anaximander. This does not mean that 
what is expressed in Anaximander’s saying is simply some vague indeterminacy. The 
words dike, adikia and tisis in the fragment, Heidegger furthermore notes, do not 
have a limited disciplinary meaning, but rather a broad or rich signification which 
cannot simply be confined to the traditional disciplines. They are specifically used “to 
bring to language the manifold totality in its essential unity” (Heidegger 1984, 22). 
What Anaximander says is therefore anything but primitive, a confusion between 
disciplines, or simply an anthropomorphic interpretation of the world.  
 
We can only enter into dialogue with the Greek thinkers when listening occurs, 
Heidegger contends. This requires that the words that are usually understood as 
referring to ‘beings’ and ‘to be’ are heard in a different way. These include ta onta 
(beings), einai (to be), estin (is), and on (being) (Heidegger 1984, 23). Heidegger 
emphasises that he does not wish to question the correctness of the traditional way in 
which these words are translated. He however asks whether we have really thought 
what the words ‘being’ and ‘to be’ mean in our own languages and furthermore 
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whether these translations are sufficient in order to understand what the Greeks were 
addressing with these words (Heidegger 1984, 24). According to Heidegger (1984, 
25), in early Greek thinking Being still illuminates itself in beings which makes a 
claim to a certain essence of man. This essence of man unfolds historically as a 
sending of Being. Being at the same time grants or safeguards (wahren) this essence 
and releases it without the essence separating itself from Being (Heidegger 1984, 25; 
2003, 310). The reason for the forgetting of Being in Western thinking lies in the 
fateful withdrawal of Being as it reveals itself in beings or in Being’s holding on to its 
truth (Heidegger 1984, 26). In its illumination of beings, Being sets them adrift in 
errancy. The inability of man to see himself, Heidegger (1984, 26) notes, 
“corresponds to the self-concealing of the lighting of Being”. World history could be 
said to be a result of this keeping to itself or epoche of Being (Heidegger 1984, 26-7). 
The important question in translating the fragment is therefore whether it speaks to 
us of onta in their Being (Heidegger 1984, 27). Heidegger clearly believes that this 
question should be answered in the affirmative. We have to look at ta onta not simply 
in terms of what it expresses, Heidegger (1984, 28) points out, but in terms of its 
source which is also the source from which the fragment speaks. It is therefore 
necessary to at first remain outside the fragment so as to, as Heidegger (1984, 28) 
puts it, “experience what ta onta, thought in Greek, says”. 
 
Remaining for that reason for the moment ‘outside’ the fragment, Heidegger first 
considers the question of its authenticity. He notes that it is not clear from 
Simplicius’s quotation of the Anaximander fragment where it starts or where it ends 
(Heidegger 1984, 28). Based on the words used, some of which according to 
Heidegger (1984, 28-9) are Aristotelian in structure and tone rather than archaic, and 
the practice of quotation of the Greeks, he concludes that only the following can be 
regarded as an actual quotation from Anaximander: “…kata to chreon. didonai gar 
auta diken kai tisin allelois tes adikias”.8 It is also precisely this part, as Heidegger 
(1984, 30) points out, which is regarded as ‘rather poetic’ by Theophrastus, which 
therefore hints at their ‘original’ nature. This does not however mean that the rest of 
the paragraph of Simplicius has to be disregarded: it can still serve as secondary 
testimony concerning Anaximander’s thinking. This brings us to the question of how 
the words genesis (originating) and phthora (passing away) in the part left out are to 
be understood. Must they in other words be understood as pre-conceptual words 
(taking account of the fact that conceptuality is possible only from the moment that 
Being is interpreted as idea, and from then on is unavoidable) or as Platonic-
Aristotelian conceptual terms (Heidegger 1984, 29-30)? In light of the above, the 
answer to this question is evident. Heidegger (1984, 30) thus takes the view that 
genesis and phthora are not to be understood in the modern sense of development 
and decline, but in the light of physis (Being) “as ways of luminous rising and 
decline”. Although genesis can be interpreted as originating, it should therefore be 
understood here as “a movement which lets every emerging being abandon 
                                                 
8
 In the earlier version (Heidegger 1981, 51), the first and last parts, which are left out in the later version, are 
still analysed as part of the fragment.  
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concealment and go forward into unconcealment” (Heidegger 1984, 30). Similarly 
phthora must be understood as a going which “abandons unconcealment, departing 
and withdrawing into concealment” (Heidegger 1984, 30).  
 
In light of the reasons for the exclusion of the first part of what is traditionally 
thought as making out part of the fragment, Heidegger (1984, 30-1) notes that we 
cannot be sure whether Anaximander used the words on or ta onta, although there 
are no indications against this. Insofar as the word auta in the second clause is 
concerned, because of what it says and also because of its reference back to kata to 
chreon, it must necessarily be understood as a reference to “being-in-totality 
experienced in a pre-conceptual way”, or to beings. A more difficult question is what 
ta onta refers to when account is taken of the above (Heidegger 1984, 31). Heidegger 
points out that ta onta, with all its modifications (estin, en, estai, einai), speaks 
everywhere in the Greek language. In terms of its subject matter, its time and the 
realm to which it belongs, it provides us with an opportunity to consider something 
which lies outside philosophy (Heidegger 1984, 31-2). In Plato and Aristotle, on and 
onta become conceptual terms, from which the terms ontic and ontological are 
derived. The word on however has a double function: it refers both to the ‘to be’ of a 
being and to a ‘being’ which ‘is’. The distinction between ‘to be’ and ‘a being’ lies 
concealed in on, Heidegger (1984, 32) notes. The words on and onta are presumably 
truncated forms of the original words eon and eonta which are used inter alia by 
Parmenides and Heraclitus (Heidegger 1984, 32-3). The ‘e’ which relates on and onta 
to estin and einai are thus only to be found in these original words (Heidegger 1984, 
32). The word eon (usually translated as ‘being’) is not only the singular form of eonta 
(usually translated as ‘beings’) but refers to Being or as Heidegger (1984, 33) 
expresses it, to “what is singular as such, what is singular in its numerical unity and 
what is singularly and unifyingly one before all number”.  
 
The word eonta is explored further by Heidegger with reference to a passage in 
Homer’s Iliad where the seer Kalchas is called on to explain the reasons for the 
plague sent by Apollo to the Greek camp. What appears from this passage is firstly 
that a distinction is drawn between ta t’ eonta (that which is in being), ta t’ essomena 
(that which will be) and pro t’ eonta (the being that once was). Ta eonta thus refers to 
‘being’ in the sense of the present (Heidegger 1984, 34). The present is however not 
here to be understood in the modern sense of a ‘now’ as a moment in time or in terms 
of a subject representing an object to itself. The ‘present’ must be understood in terms 
of the essence of eonta, and not vice versa. The word eonta nevertheless refers also to 
the past and the future, that is, to beings that are not presently present. Beings which 
are past and to come are also to be understood here in terms of what is present, that 
is, they are beings not presently present. This is borne out by the reference the Greeks 
made to that which is presently present as ta pareonta, meaning ‘alongside’, in the 
sense of coming alongside into unconcealment. That which is present is therefore not 
to be understood in relation to a subject, but rather in terms of “an open expanse…of 
unconcealment, into which and within which whatever comes along lingers” 
(Heidegger 1984, 34). As should be clear from the above, that which is presently 
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present (ta eonta) cannot be understood in isolation from what is absent. As 
Heidegger (1984, 35) puts it, “[e]ven what is absent is something present, for as 
absent from the expanse, it presents itself in unconcealment”. What is presently 
present is also only such in its lingering awhile, that is, in its arriving in-between a 
double absence. The experience of the seer Kalchas, as Heidegger (1984, 35-6) points 
out, consists in a gathering of all things present and absent. He in other words has an 
experience of Being itself. 
 
Being, as the presencing of what is present, Heidegger (1984, 37) contends, must be 
understood as already truth in itself. Truth must not however here be understood in 
the metaphysical sense as a property of beings or of Being. Truth in other words does 
not refer to a characteristic of divine or human cognition or a property in the sense of 
a quality. Instead, truth must in light of the above be understood as the gathering that 
clears and shelters. Heidegger (1984, 37) spells out the following implications of this 
understanding of Being for that which presences: 
 
What is presently present in unconcealment lingers in unconcealment as in an open 
expanse. Whatever lingers (or whiles) in the expanse proceeds to it from 
unconcealment and arrives in unconcealment. But what is present is arriving or 
lingering insofar as it is also already departing from unconcealment toward 
concealment. What is presently present lingers awhile. It endures in approach and 
withdrawal. Lingering is the transition from coming to going: what is present is what 
in each case lingers. Lingering in transition, it lingers still in approach and lingers 
already in departure.  
 
The (excluded) section directly preceding the fragment should therefore be 
understood not as expressing simply the passing away or inevitable destruction of 
things as appears at first sight, but rather as giving expression to their transitional 
structure (De Boer 2000, 178). Underlying and pervading the lingering of things in 
presence is their arising out of and returning to absence or unconcealment and is to 
be compared with the metaphysical approach of excluding from what is present all 
absence. This clearly assists with an understanding of Being itself, namely as a 
presence which is thoroughly pervaded by absence (Heidegger 1984, 37; De Boer 
2000, 178). We could also say that Being must be understood as presencing 
embedded in a twofold absence (Heidegger 1984, 41; De Boer 2000, 179). This 
amounts to a jointure (Fuge) between presencing and its twofold absence (Heidegger 
1984, 41; 2003, 327). In the words of Heidegger (1984, 41-2): “What is present 
emerges by approaching and passes away by departing; it does both at the same time, 
indeed because it lingers”. This analysis also informs Heidegger’s translation of dike: 
not as justice as is usually the case, but as joint or juncture (Fug or Fuge) or as 
referring to (the claim of) Being (Heidegger 1984, 39, 43; 2000, 177-8).  
 
Heidegger (1984, 37-8) continues his analysis by pointing out that also in Homer, ta 
eonta does not refer exclusively to the things in nature or to objects of human 
representation. This of course ties in with Heidegger’s reading of the reference to 
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‘beings’ in the fragment as referring not only to the things in nature. Homer applies 
the term eonta inter alia to “the Achaean’s encampment before Troy, the god’s wrath, 
the plague’s fury, funeral pyres, [and] the perplexity of the leaders” (Heidegger 1984, 
38). Man too belongs to eonta, Heidegger (1984, 38) points out: “[H]e is that present 
being which, illuminating, apprehending, and thus gathering, lets what is present as 
such become present in unconcealment”. After this analysis of that which lies 
‘outside’ and which at the same time serves as the source of the fragment, Heidegger 
returns to the fragment itself by commenting on its second clause. The word auta, he 
points out, refers back to what was named in the first clause: ta onta, which as we saw 
refers to everything presently and un-presently present in unconcealment (Heidegger 
1984, 40). As indicated above, this includes a reference to everything that presences 
by lingering awhile: “gods and men, temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and snake, 
tree and shrub, wind and light, stone and sand, day and night” (Heidegger 1984, 40).  
 
The question Heidegger (1984, 41) poses next is what at bottom runs through 
whatever is present, or stated differently, what is the basic trait of what is present. 
The answer: adikia. For the reasons stated above, Heidegger however wants to depart 
from the traditional translation of this word as ‘injustice’. He then asks three 
questions which necessarily take us back to the question of technology addressed 
earlier, as well as the ontological (which is at the same time an ‘ethical’) question of 
respecting others as others:  
 
How is what lingers awhile in presence unjust? What is unjust about it? Is it not the 
right of whatever is present that in each case it linger awhile, endure and so fulfil its 
presencing? (Heidegger 1984, 41)  
 
In seeking an answer to these questions, Heidegger (1984, 41) notes that the word a-
dikia suggests that dike is absent. Dike is often translated as ‘right’ and even as 
‘penalty’. Heidegger however contends that to really understand what comes to 
language in the fragment we must resist our moral-juridical notions. The fragment 
can then be heard to say that wherever adikia rules, all is not right with things, that 
is, something is out of joint. This raises the question whether the traditional 
translations of dike fit here. Heidegger points out that the fragment does not say that 
what is present is only occasionally out of joint. It says that what is present as such is 
out of joint. What presences can however only possibly be out of joint, Heidegger 
contends, if presencing at the same time consists of jointure. The joining or jointure 
that is at stake here relates to the discussion above of ‘whiling’. As we saw, whiling is 
necessarily related to a two-fold absence: approaching and withdrawal. It is in this 
‘between’ where the jointure is to be found. Heidegger (1984, 41-2) phrases this as 
follows: 
 
In both directions presencing is conjointly disposed toward absence. Presencing 
comes about in such a jointure. What is present emerges by approaching and passes 
away by departing; it does both at the same time, indeed because it lingers. The 
“while” occurs essentially in the jointure. 
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How are we to understand the fragment when it says that adikia, understood now as 
disjointure, is the fundamental trait of eonta? Heidegger (1984, 42-3) understands 
adikia here as the attempt of what is present to endure, or to insist upon its while. 
This seems to tie in directly with his analysis of modern technology as briefly set out 
above, as well as with the ontological question of the respect to be accorded to others 
as others. As we saw, Heidegger (1993, 244) contends that modern technology’s 
‘essence’ lies in subjectivism or the self-assertion of man as an attempt to ensure 
security and certainty. Man in other words abandons his relation to Being in 
Platonism, and even more so in modernity, the age which is most characterised by 
adikia (cf. Scott 1994, 140). Heidegger (1984, 42) however points out that the 
fragment does not only say that what is present consists in disjunction. In spite of the 
attempt of man to maintain himself in disjuncture, he still remains in a relation with 
Being (Heidegger 1984, 43).  
 
This brings us to the translation of the word didonai. Heidegger (1984, 43) seeks to 
relate didonai in the fragment to diken and reads it as saying that “whatever lingers 
awhile with a view to disjunction didonai diken, gives jointure”. Heidegger (1984, 43) 
then asks what ‘give’ means here. He continues as follows:  
 
How should whatever lingers awhile, whatever comes to presence in disjunction, be 
able to give jointure? Can it give what it doesn’t have? If it gives anything at all, 
doesn’t it give jointure away? Where and how does that which is present for the time 
being give jointure? 
 
According to Heidegger, giving here relates to the manner of presencing. Giving in 
this context does not entail giving away, but acceding or giving-to (Zugeben), giving 
what properly belongs to another (Heidegger 1984, 43; 2003, 329). As we saw above, 
what belongs to that which is present is the jointure of its while. In the jointure, 
whatever lingers keeps to its while. It does not insist upon sheer persistence. Jointure 
therefore belongs to whatever lingers awhile, which in turn belongs in the jointure. 
Heidegger at this point equates jointure with order. Dike is thus to be understood as 
enjoining order. Adikia, on the other hand, is disjunction or disorder. Whatever 
comes to presence does not therefore simply fall into disjunction, but instead 
surmounts disorder (Heidegger 1984, 44). The word didonai is consequently to be 
understood as designating this “letting belong to” (Heidegger 1984, 44). This 
amounts also to an acceptance by that which comes to presence that it belongs to the 
non-present, in other words, to death (Arendt 1977, part II 193), which as we know 
from Being and Time (1962, 294) belongs to man as his own-most possibility, “the 
possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” (cf. Heidegger 1984, 101). 
 
The next question Heidegger (1984, 44-5) considers is to whom didonai diken or the 
giving of order is directed. On Heidegger’s reading, present beings only become 
present when they let enjoining order belong allelois, that is, to one another. The 
word allelois in the fragment, according to Heidegger, is not related to diken and to 
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tisin as the translation of Diels has it, but only to tisin. The latter word, Heidegger 
points out, is usually translated as penalty. This translation is not wrong, but this is 
not the original and essential significance of the word. Heidegger instead relates 
tisin/tisis to esteem and to heed, to taking care of something. This stands in contrast 
with what was said above regarding adikia. In seeking to persist, as we saw, that 
which lingers awhile does not pay attention to the others that linger, to the order of 
the while (Heidegger 1984, 45-6). They instead strike “a haughty pose toward every 
other of its kind. None heeds the lingering presence of the other” (Heidegger 1984, 
45-6).9 In order to bring tisis in line with its more original meaning as well as in 
relating it to what was said above regarding adikia, Heidegger (1984, 46; 2003, 332) 
translates tisis as Ruch or reck (care), which consists in letting something remain in 
its essence or as itself. This part of the fragment can therefore be understood as 
saying that beings which linger awhile let order (Fug) belong, didonai diken, insofar 
as they do not disperse themselves by arrogantly persisting and not leaving room for 
each other among what is present (Heidegger 1984, 47; 2003, 332). Beings in other 
words give order by allowing reck to pervade their relation with others, didonai…kai 
tisin allelois (Heidegger 1984, 47). We must therefore understand allelois in close 
relation with tisis and within the context of the manifold of what lingers awhile (ta 
eonta) in the open expanse of unconcealment and not simply as indeterminate 
reciprocity in a chaotic manifold as the translations of the fragment usually have it. 
The word kai between diken and tisin is consequently also not simply to be 
understood in its usual sense as ‘and’, but as describing the manner in which beings 
grant order: by giving reck to one another. 
 
The word adikia is according to Heidegger in light of the above to be understood as 
referring to the disorder of the reckless. Beings in other words let order belong, and 
thereby also reck to one another, in the surmounting of disorder (adikia). The 
questions Heidegger (1984, 48-9) seeks to answer next are to whom the order of 
jointure belongs and what brings about this order. This is essentially about the 
relation between the first and the second clauses and establishing which clause is the 
determining clause. To answer these questions, Heidegger shifts his attention to the 
word gar, translated as ‘for’ or ‘namely’. This word serves as a reference back to the 
first clause, Heidegger points out. The second clause, one could say in light of the 
discussion above, comments on the manner of the presencing of what is present. The 
only remaining words of the first clause, kata to chreon, usually translated as 
‘according to necessity’, must therefore speak of presencing itself as well as the extent 
to which presencing determines what is present as such. Only in this way can the 
second clause, by commenting on the manner of presencing of the present, refer back 
to the first clause by means of gar. The question this raises is whether presencing is 
to be understood in terms of what is present, or the other way around. The word kata, 
usually translated as ‘according to’, here means, Heidegger contends, ‘from up there’ 
                                                 
9
 Wolf (1950, 231-3) gives a detailed analysis of adikia in this respect. The privilege accorded in this reading to a 
close-nit community (see 230-1) in attempting to translate Heidegger’s thinking of Being into Being-with-others-
in-law, is noteworthy; see Wolf (1972, 140-159); and Minkkinen (1999, 75-82) for an excellent analysis of 
Wolf’s fundamental ontology of law. 
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or ‘from over there’. The word thus “refers back to something from which something 
lower comes to presence, as from something higher and its consequent” (Heidegger 
1984, 49). As Heidegger points out, that which is present can only become present as 
such in consequence of presencing. As we saw, it is only in the surmounting of 
disorder (adikia) that what lingers awhile can become present. Adikia nonetheless 
constantly haunts lingering as an essential possibility. As we also saw, beings which 
linger awhile let order belong and also reck among one another. This provides the 
answer for Heidegger as to whom the order of jointure belongs to: to that which 
comes to presence by way of presencing, which occurs by means of a surmounting. 
Because of the essential relation between the two clauses, Heidegger (1984, 49) 
furthermore concludes that chreon is in turn that which “enjoins matters in such a 
way that whatever is present lets order and reck belong”. 
 
Heidegger next proceeds to consider the meaning of to chreon. As already indicated, 
ever since Being becomes the idea in Plato, a distinction is no longer drawn between 
presencing and what is present. Presencing is instead understood as the most 
universal or the highest of present beings, in this way also becoming a being among 
other beings (Heidegger 1984, 50). The essence of presencing, and thus also the 
distinction between presencing (Being) and what is present (beings), in this way 
remains forgotten. According to Heidegger this forgetting of the ontological 
difference is not a result of some inadequacy in thinking. It instead belongs to the 
self-veiling essence or the destiny of Being, since Being keeps to itself. Because of this, 
the ontological difference collapses and remains forgotten. In this forgetting of Being 
the history of the Western world, that is metaphysics, comes to the fore (Heidegger 
1984, 51). That which ‘is’, or is regarded to exist, stands in the shadow of the oblivion 
of Being. The importance of the early Greek thinkers, as indicated above, lies in their 
preceding of this history. Even though these thinkers did not think the ontological 
difference in itself, its trace can still be detected in their language (Heidegger 1984, 
50-1). The word chreon, Heidegger (1984, 51) points out, derives from chrao, 
chraomai and alludes to the hand (he cheir), and suggests getting involved with 
something, reaching for it, extending one’s hand to it. The word chrao also bears the 
connotation of placing something in someone’s hands or of handing over, delivering, 
or letting something belong to someone (Heidegger 1984, 51-2). This delivery 
nonetheless keeps the transfer in hand as well as that which is transferred. To chreon 
must consequently be understood as “the handing over of presence which presencing 
delivers to what is present, and which thus keeps in hand, i.e. preserves in presencing, 
what is present as such” (Heidegger 1984, 52).  
 
Heidegger (1984, 52; 2003, 338) thus translates to chreon as der Brauch, which Krell 
renders as ‘usage’. Usage as a translation of to chreon is not to be understood here in 
the usual and ‘modern’ sense of “utilizing and benefiting from what we have a right to 
use” (Heidegger 1984, 52). It should be understood in the sense of to brook 
[bruchen], Latin frui, German fruchten, Frucht, Heidegger (1984, 53; 2003, 338) 
contends. The originary sense of ‘usage’, as Heidegger points out, is to enjoy and to be 
pleased with something. Only in its derived sense does it refer to consuming or 
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gobbling up. Along the lines of usage is thus to be thought as letting something 
present come to presence as such or in light of the above, “to hand something over to 
its own essence and to keep it in hand, preserving it as something present” 
(Heidegger 1984, 53). Enjoyment is therefore not to be identified with some form of 
human behaviour, and consequently with some being, not even of the highest being. 
It rather refers to “the manner in which Being itself presences as the relation to what 
is present, approaching and becoming involved with what is present as present: to 
chreon” (Heidegger 1984, 53). This translation is furthermore to be viewed in light of 
the relation between Being and man. Being is ‘needful’ of an abode, which is only to 
be found in man (Heidegger 1982, 244). Being itself is need (das Brauchen) and man, 
as we saw above, is in need of Being (Heidegger 1982, 244, 248). Heidegger (1984, 
54) summarises as follows this understanding of to chreon and its relation to tisis and 
dike: 
 
As dispenser of the portions of the jointure [of what is present in the transition 
between twofold absence (arrival and departure)], usage is the fateful joining: the 
enjoining of order and thereby of reck. Usage distributes order and reck in such 
manner that it reserves for itself what is meted out, gathers it to itself, and secures it 
as what is present in presencing. 
 
The enjoining of order necessarily involves the limitation of what is present and thus 
also the imposition of boundaries. This brings us to the question of the apeiron, the 
boundless or indefinite in the thinking of Anaximander as the origin of everything 
that is present. The apeiron is mentioned by Simplicius in the first part of his 
exposition of Anaximander’s thinking quoted above. To chreon is at the same time 
apeiron, Heidegger (1984, 54) contends. As we saw earlier, accompanying the process 
of presencing as jointure, there is the constant danger of disjointure. Usage, insofar as 
it is also the boundless, is responsible for this too.  
 
Heidegger’s translation of the fragment finally reads as follows: “…entlang dem 
Brauch; gehören nämlich lassen sie Fug somit auch Ruch eines dem Anderen [im 
Verwinden] des Un-Fugs” (Heidegger 2003, 342). Krell translates this as follows: 
“…along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby reck belong to one another 
(in the surmounting) of disorder” (Heidegger 1984, 57).10 Heidegger’s 
acknowledgement that this translation cannot be proved scientifically and that it is 
not based on a philological and historical analysis, is of course no reason for ridicule, 
but is based on the realisation that the whole notion of proof is a product of 
metaphysics which poses man as subject (as against an object) as the ultimate 
measure of things (Heidegger 1982, 238). Heidegger’s reflection on the Anaximander 
fragment in this specific way is thus clearly also an attempt to think through the crisis 
                                                 
10
 Heidegger (1981, 123) concludes that in every word of the fragment, Being is spoken of, also there where it 
specifically mentions beings. Diels and Kranz (1951, 487-8) have declared in response to Heidegger’s translation 
that in the language of the 6th century BC the concepts dike, adikia, diken, didonai and tisis, already belonged to 
the specific sphere of the law and that to chreon can never mean ‘der Brauch’. 
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of the modern age. This crisis, Heidegger (1984, 57) notes towards the end of his 
analysis, cannot be understood by applying the modes of thought of the current age: 
 
Curiously enough, the saying first resonates when we set aside the claims of our 
familiar ways of representing things, as we ask ourselves in what the confusion of the 
contemporary world’s fate consists. 
Man has already begun to overwhelm the entire earth and its atmosphere, to arrogate 
to himself in forms of energy the concealed powers of nature, and to submit future 
history to the planning and ordering of a world government. This same defiant man is 
utterly at a loss simply to say what is; to say what this is – that a thing is. 
 
At first sight this passage appears to confirm the wide-spread view of Heidegger as an 
enemy of technology, a reactionary, and an extreme nationalist, an expression 
therefore of a narrow-minded provincialism. Read attentively, with reference also to 
Heidegger’s other texts, the passage does not amount to a critique of or opposition to 
modern technology. It instead views modern technology as pointing to the sending of 
Being in the modern age in the form of will to power. Insofar as the apparent negative 
evaluation of the United Nations in this passage is concerned, reading this statement 
together with Heidegger’s other statements on internationalism, casts some light 
thereon. Internationalism, at least in its current form, is according to Heidegger 
(1993, 244-5; 1977, 152-3) simply an extension of collective or national subjectivism 
to the international level (cf. Derrida 2001a, 408-9 n 79 and 80).  
 
DERRIDA’S EVALUATION OF HEIDEGGER’S READING 
 
Derrida understands and commends Heidegger’s Der Spruch as an attempt at a 
thinking of justice which goes beyond juridical-moral considerations. Derrida’s main 
question in Specters of Marx is however whether Heidegger does not privilege, as he 
does elsewhere, the gathering or joining of Being rather than its disjoining or 
dissemination. As Derrida (1994, 27) puts it, does Heidegger not skew the asymmetry 
between the gift and what is given (“the accorded favour”), in favour of the given? 
This seems to happen in spite of the fact that Heidegger himself posits what is given 
as the accorded favour, in this case “of the accord that gathers or collects while 
harmonizing” (Derrida 1994, 27). This move carries the risk of re-inscribing justice 
under the sign of presence. His thinking of didonai diken, as Heidegger (1984, 43; 
2003, 329) himself notes, is an attempt to think dike on “the basis of Being as 
presencing” (aus dem Sein als Anwesen gedacht) and as “the ordering and enjoining 
Order” (der fugend-fügende Fug). Although this presence is a received or unveiled 
presence (Being as presencing), it remains appropriable and gathered together 
(Derrida 1994, 27; 1987a, 318). A further difficulty in Heidegger’s reading lies in his 
constant invocation of more ‘original meanings’. This invocation is based on the 
assumption that there is some fixed sense, object or referent anterior (some being or 
Being itself) and exterior to the word and is according to Derrida (2007, 102) 
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provoked by a desire for presence.11 For Derrida (2007, 99, 404; 1998, 73-5 fn 30; 
1986, xxxvi-xlviii) meaning is always derived, a strategy or economy of deferral or 
deterrence. This of course does not make Heidegger’s reading wrong in any sense, but 
it calls for a reading of the fragment which exceeds the primary focus on Being. 
Derrida (1994, 27) therefore asks whether it is not rather in the Un-Fug, disjointure 
or dissemination of Being (and of time), in other words, in adikia, that a relation to 
the other as other, that is justice, is possible (cf. Derrida 2005a, 150).12 The 
consequence of the privilege accorded by Heidegger to gathering rather than 
dissociation is that one risks leaving “no room for the other, for the radical otherness 
of the other, for the radical singularity of the other” (Derrida and Caputo 1997, 14).  
 
To say that Heidegger privileges gathering, does not mean that he disregards 
disjointure completely. Heidegger’s text, due to its heterogeneity,13 necessarily stands 
open to a different reading and in the first part of his short commentary Derrida 
emphasises specifically those parts of the text where Heidegger notes, but does not 
thematise the splitting, division or dissension in Being (cf. Derrida 2008, 7-26).14 One 
could say that Derrida’s reading of the fragment entails a different way of ‘listening’ 
than that of Heidegger (Derrida 1982, ix –xxix; 1993). This ‘notion’ of a division or 
split in Being can easily be misunderstood. In brief, to speak of the split in Being or of 
the ‘other’ of Being, does not amount simply to a falling back onto beings, and more 
specifically on the human being as ‘concrete other’, for example (Derrida 2001a, 168-
9).  
 
Derrida thus emphasises, more so than Heidegger, the dissension in Being. This 
dissension makes joining, and thus also Being and ontology, possible (Derrida 1994, 
51).15 It also necessarily involves a relation with death, but the latter no longer 
belongs to Being in the way in which beings, and specifically Dasein, belong to Being 
in Heidegger’s analysis. Heidegger (1962, 294; 1984, 101) views death as an essential 
                                                 
11
 This should not be understood simply as a ‘psychological’ reading of Heidegger. The desire for presence that 
Derrida invokes here stands in a differantial relation with the desire for death, a structure or rather ‘stricture’ 
which clearly exceeds and ‘precedes’ psychology and psychoanalysis, as well as ontology and phenomenology; 
see Derrida (1987b). 
12
 Derrida explores briefly certain aspects of Heidegger’s Der Spruch elsewhere, eg in Derrida (2008, 49; 2005b, 
84-5; 1998, 60; 1982, 64-7; 1993, 195). 
13
 The notion of heterogeneity requires letting go of the assumption that a text is simply a consciously organized 
whole. A text is instead (also) to be read as being ruled by an illegible remainder in the unconscious; see also 
Derrida and Ferraris (2001, 9). 
14
 See further Derrida (2007, 114-5) on the words Anwesen (being or becoming present, or presencing) and 
Anwesenheit (presence) in Heidegger (1977, 115-54), and which we see in Heidegger’s statement regarding the 
attempt to think dike on “the basis of Being as presencing” (aus dem Sein als Anwesen gedacht) (Heidegger 
1984, 43; 2003, 329).  
15
 The dissension in being which must be overcome is also addressed by Heidegger in a number of other texts. 
Especially illuminating is Heidegger (2000, 141-2) where he notes that in order to open itself to unconcealment, 
Being has to gather itself, in other words it has to “have rank and maintain it”. He continues as follows: 
“Gathering is never just driving together and piling up. It maintains in a belonging-together that which contends 
and strives in confrontation. It does not allow it to decay into mere dispersion and what is simply cast down” (at 
142).  
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part of life,16 but still as the own-most possibility of Dasein. To have a relation with 
the other as other, a different thinking of the relation with death is required. This is 
made possible, as Derrida has shown elsewhere, by an analysis of the law of language 
(and of technology)17 as well as Freud’s analysis of the death drive (Derrida 1987b).18  
ADIKIA AS ‘HIGHER LAW’ 
 
Does the Anaximander fragment indeed speak of a higher law as was suggested in the 
introduction? In the readings of both Derrida and Heidegger the fragment refers to a 
splitting, division, dissension or dissemination in Being which ‘precedes’ Being (cf. 
Derrida 2007, 122, 127). Both readings refer to a disjointedness in all that is living (all 
beings) because of the disjointedness in Being itself. Heidegger, primarily because of 
his analysis of death as belonging to Dasein, emphasises gathering or joining and the 
need for adikia to be surmounted. Derrida, on the other hand, attempts to bring to 
the fore that the Greeks did not only have a pre-metaphysical experience of Being 
itself or of presencing, but that in their texts there are also traces of an impossible 
experience of disjointedness (cf. Derrida 2007, 115). On Derrida’s reading the 
assurance that lies in the original gathering, sending and epochality of Being is placed 
in question by adikia (cf. Derrida 2007, 104, 120-2, 404-5; and Marrati 2005, 93-4). 
There can now no longer be any guarantee of destiny gathering itself up, identifying 
itself, or determining itself (Derrida 2007, 128). This dissemination or the thrown-
ness of Dasein offers a chance and a responsibility without limit which necessarily 
has implications for the reading of texts (Derrida 2007, 128, 352-3). Every text 
throughout the history of Being, also every legal text, is affected by adikia as its law 
and must therefore be read to speak thereof (cf. Derrida 2007, 405). This ‘must’ 
remains a choice, but we are always already situated within the ‘space’ of this choice 
(Derrida 1997, under heading 4). Both natural law and positive law are furthermore 
derived from this law. This (higher) law is nonetheless without power and mastery. It 
involves the greatest weakness and is nothing present. It speaks of a disjunction in 
time which precedes the notions of presence and absence. This disjunction is the 
result of a desire which precedes all desire, of absolute pleasure, death which does not 
‘belong’ to ‘me’ or to ‘us’; it involves dispersion, and dissemination without return. 
This desire precedes philosophy, psychoanalysis, ontology and law. It can be called 
unconditional justice, the gift without return, or absolute hospitality. It haunts, and 
will continue to haunt both positive and natural law. 
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 Heidegger (2000, 139) explains this in simple terms as follows: “For the capricious, life is just life. For them, 
death is death and only that. But the Being of life is also death. Everything that comes to life thereby already 
begins to die as well, to go towards its death, and death is also life.”  
17
 Derrida (1989b, 10) reads Heidegger’s insistence that the essence of technology is nothing technological 
(Heidegger 1977, 20) as a (still) very traditional philosophical approach insofar as it seeks to purify essence from 
original contamination by technology. Derrida (1989a, 140-1) for this reason contends that the essence of 
technology is (still) technological and cannot be thought without death. 
18
 This analysis of Freud (2001a, 7-64) in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Derrida reads as being to some 
extent in tension with the role and importance Freud attributes to the Oedipus complex; see also Freud (2001b, 
153-154) on the Anaximander fragment and the Oedipus complex. 
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